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Abstract: The public has a pact with the experts who deliver public health. That pact 
can be characterized as a relationship of trust in which the public trusts health ex-
perts to act in its best interests in return for its adherence to recommendations and 
other advice. This relationship clearly has emotional elements, as evidenced by strong 
feelings of anger and betrayal when public health recommendations are shown to be 
wrong. But it also has rational or logical components which are less often acknowl-
edged by commentators. In this paper, these components are examined with special 
emphasis on the role of authority arguments in mediating the trust relationship be-
tween health experts and the public. It is contended that these arguments function 
as cognitive heuristics in that they facilitate decision-making in the absence of expert 
knowledge. A questionnaire study of public health reasoning was conducted in 879 
members of the public. Participants were asked to consider a number of public health 
scenarios in which various arguments from authority were employed. Epistemic con-
ditions, known to be associated with the rational warrant of these arguments, were 
systematically varied across these scenarios. Quantitative and qualitative data analy-
ses revealed that subjects are adept at recognizing the conditions under which argu-
ments from authority are more or less rationally warranted. The trust relationship 
at the heart of public health has logical components which lay people are capable of 
rationally evaluating during public health deliberations. This rational capacity should 
be exploited by experts during public health communication. 
Keywords: Argument from authority, expertise, heuristic, public health communi-
cation, reasoning, trust.
Resumen: El público tiene un pacto con los expertos que entregan la salud pública. 
Este	pacto	puede	ser	caracterizado	como	una	relación	de	confianza	en	la	que	el	pú-
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blico confía en los expertos en salud para actuar por su mejor interés en retorno a su 
adeherencia a las recomendaciones y otros consejos. Esta relación claramente tiene 
elementos emocionales, tal como se evidencia por los fuertes sentimientos de rabia 
y traición cuando las recomendaciones de salud pública se muestran erróneas. Pero 
tiene también componentes racionales o lógicos que son a menudo menos conocidos 
por comentadores. En este trabajo, estos componentes son examinados con especial 
énfasis en el rol de los argumentos por autoridad en tanto mediación de la relación 
de	confianza	entre	los	expertos	en	salud	y	el	público.	Se	postula	que	estos	argumentos	
funcionan como una heurística cognitiva en el sentido de que facilitan la toma de de-
cisión en la ausencia de un conocimiento experto. Se aplicó un cuestionario sobre ra-
zonamiento en salud público en un estudio con 879 miembros del público. A los par-
ticipantes se les preguntó considerar un número de escenarios de salud pública en los 
que varios argumentos por autoridad fueron empleados. Las condiciones epistémi-
cas, asociadas con la garantía racional de estos argumentos, fueron sistemáticamente 
cruzadas entre estos escenarios. Los datos cuantitativos y cualitativos relevaron que 
los sujetos son adeptos a reconocer las condiciones bajo las que los argumentos por 
autoridad	son	más	o	menos	racionalmente	garantizados.	La	relación	de	confianza	en	
el corazón de la salud pública tiene componentes lógicos que muestra que la gente 
común es capaz de evaluar racionalmente las deliberaciones en la salud públcia. Esta 
capacidad racional debería ser explotada por los espertos durante la comunicación de 
salud pública.
Palabras clave:	Argumento	por	autoridad,	confianza,	experticia,	heurística,	comu-
nicación en salud pública, razonamiento.
1. Introduction
Relationships of trust are the basis of our everyday interactions with oth-
ers. From purchasing goods to engaging in romantic relationships, we trust 
other people to operate in good faith with us, and are sorely disappointed 
when they do not. Public health is another domain of our lives in which 
trust is fundamental. Without trust, we would be disinclined to heed calls 
to have our children vaccinated against infectious diseases, to avoid risk-
taking sexual behaviour and to modify lifestyles which predispose us to ill-
ness and premature death. Yet, there is substantial evidence to suggest that 
trust in public health is in a precarious state. Factors which have eroded 
trust in public health include prominent public health failures (e.g. the BSE 
crisis	in	the	UK),	media	amplification	of	health	issues	(e.g.	pandemic	influ-
enzas),	the	perception	that	science	is	tainted	by	conflicts	of	interest,	and	an	
increasing lack of deference to medical expertise. (The reader is referred 
to Cummings (2014a) for further discussion of these factors.) The com-
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bined effect of these factors has been the attenuation of the trust relation-
ship that is the basis of all public health work. To rebuild that relationship 
will require an understanding of the nature of trust on the part of public 
health professionals. It is argued in this paper that trust consists of both 
emotional and logical factors. While emotional factors are what we expect 
of an affective concept like trust, there has been little attention given to 
the logical dimensions of this notion. It will be contended that a so-called 
informal fallacy, known as the argument from authority, provides a logical 
framework for our understanding of trust in public health. This view is sup-
ported through an examination of the logical features of the argument from 
authority	on	the	one	hand,	and	consideration	of	the	findings	of	a	study	of	
public health reasoning in 879 members of the public on the other hand. 
The discussion will unfold along the following lines. The concept of 
trust in public health has given rise to an extensive empirical literature. 
Investigators now have a clear understanding of the dimensions of trust 
which are involved in risk perception. The respective contributions of af-
fective and cognitive factors to trust have also been examined. Some of 
these studies are relevant to the argument of the current paper and their 
findings	will	be	considered	in	section	2.	While	the	work	of	social	scientists	
on trust has been insightful in many ways, these investigators have failed 
to establish a logical framework for this concept. In the absence of such a 
framework,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	explain	how	trust	 is	able	to	 influence	our	ra-
tional decision-making. This is where the work of a little known branch of 
logic called informal logic can make a powerful contribution to an under-
standing of trust in public health. Informal logicians examine arguments 
which cannot be characterized by formal (deductive) logic, but which are 
nonetheless rationally warranted within the particular contexts in which 
they are used. One such argument, known as the argument from author-
ity, provides a much needed logical apparatus for the dimensions of trust 
discussed by social scientists. The logical structure of the argument from 
authority will be examined in section 3. This section will also consider how 
this argument, like many other so-called informal fallacies, is not only non-
fallacious but can function as a cognitive heuristic during reasoning about 
public health problems. In section 4, the results of a study of public health 
reasoning	in	879	members	of	the	public	are	examined.	This	study	confirms	
a	significant	role	for	arguments	from	authority	in	the	logical	judgements	of	
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people	about	public	health	problems.	Finally,	the	relevance	of	this	finding	
for trust in public health is considered.
2. Empirical studies of trust
The empirical literature on trust is wide-ranging and, as such, is beyond a 
comprehensive examination in the current context. However, two aspects 
of that literature are relevant to the logical view of trust that is proposed in 
this	paper,	and	will	therefore	be	considered	in	this	section.	The	first	aspect	
concerns attributes of trust such as perceived objectivity, fairness and com-
petence. Increasingly, investigators are organizing these attributes accord-
ing to two or more dimensions of trust which appear to have psychological 
salience	 for	 subjects.	 The	 significance	 of	 these	 attributes,	 it	will	 be	 con-
tended subsequently, is that they provide rational warrant for the premises 
in an argument from authority. It is by virtue of this probative function in 
argument that these attributes of trust can be said to play a logical role in 
reasoning. The second aspect of the empirical literature that is of relevance 
is the relationship of cognitive and affective factors to trust. In most stud-
ies, it is argued either that trust is causally related to these factors (causal 
view) or that trust is a consequence of cognitive and affective factors (as-
sociationist view). According to the logical view of trust proposed in this 
paper, cognitive and affective factors take effect through logical argument 
with which they are intimately connected.1 An argument which is particu-
larly	significant	in	this	regard	is	the	argument	from	authority.	The	logical	
structure of the argument from authority is, in effect, the overarching mech-
anism by means of which cognitive and affective components of trust come 
into play during public health reasoning. But before we can defend this par-
ticular claim, it is necessary to consider the insights which empirical studies 
have contributed to our understanding of trust in a public health context.
1 The view that trust and affect are intimately connected to argument is in stark contrast 
to the position which is normally expressed in the literature on risk. For most theorists, 
trust and affect are distinct from argument and only come into effect during risk percep-
tion when argument is absent: ‘We will […] argue in this article that trust will mainly have 
an	effect	on	choice	behaviour	in	cases	where	knowledge	and	arguments	are	not	sufficiently	
available, urging a person to make affect-based judgments on risky activities’ (Midden and 
Huijts, 2009, p. 744).
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2.1. Dimensions of trust
Trust is a complex concept which has both conceptual and psychological 
elements. The exact nature of these elements has been the focus of much 
discussion and debate. However, this interest has yet to result in a consen-
sus concerning the main features of trust. As Midden and Huijts (2009, p. 
744)	acknowledge,	 there	 is	no	universally	shared	definition	of	 trust	with	
differences evident in the conceptualization, modelling and measurement 
of this notion among studies. One issue on which theorists do appear to 
be in agreement is the dimensionality of trust. It is now widely accepted 
by investigators that the trust concept is not one-dimensional but, in fact, 
contains many dimensions. Berry (2004, p. 21) captures this idea when 
she states that ‘[r]esearch has shown that trust is multifaceted rather than 
one-dimensional, with relevant factors including perceived competence, 
objectivity, fairness and consistency’. Berry’s four factors are collapsed into 
three in an investigation by Peters et al. (1997). In a study in which six hy-
potheses regarding the perceptions and determinants of trust were tested 
against survey data, Peters et al. found that perceptions of trust and cred-
ibility are dependent on three factors: perceptions of knowledge and ex-
pertise; perceptions of openness and honesty; and perceptions of concern 
and care. As one might expect, there is overlap between these factors and 
Berry’s criteria, with knowledge and expertise equating to competence, for 
example. Earle (2010) argues that there is a consensus among investigators 
that trust is two- or three-dimensional, with those dimensions capturing 
social-relational and ability attributes of trust. These dimensions describe 
the intentions and ability or competence of the trusted other, respectively. 
Dimensions of trust have been variously characterized across research 
studies. Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003) examined the dimensionality of 
trust	 in	government	regulation	of	risk	across	 the	 following	five	contexts:	
climate change; mobile phones; radioactive waste; GM food; and genet-
ic testing. Risk statements, which examined nine trust factors including 
competence, credibility, fairness and openness, were found to be described 
by	 two	main	 trust	 components.	The	first	 component	was	a	general	 trust	
component and comprised competence, care, fairness and openness. The 
second component included credibility, reliability and integrity. Because 
this	component	reflected	a	sceptical	view	on	how	risk	policies	were	brought	
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about, it was labelled as scepticism. These components were not only re-
produced	across	all	five	risk	contexts	but	also	across	different	samples	of	
respondents. Poortinga and Pidgeon used these two independent trust fac-
tors to propose a typology of trust in government which ranged from full 
trust to a deep type of distrust. Frewer et al. (1996) argue that knowledge 
does not in itself lead to trust. Rather, knowledge is linked with other char-
acteristics such as ‘truthfulness’, ‘trustworthiness’, ‘having a good track 
record’, ‘being concerned with public welfare’, ‘responsibility’, ‘accuracy’ 
and ‘factual’. Highly trusted sources, Frewer et al. suggest, are associated 
with multiple positive attributes in a type of ‘halo effect’. Distrust is also 
associated with multiple factors including ‘distortion of information’, ‘be-
ing proven wrong in the past’, and ‘biased information’. A source which is 
accountable elicits higher trust than one which is completely independent, 
while too much accountability is associated with dishonesty and distrust.
Although it is generally accepted that trust should be analysed accord-
ing to two or more dimensions, not all of these dimensions are equally sig-
nificant	during	risk	perception.	Earle	(2010,	p.	542)	remarks	that	across	
research contexts, the dimension of trust dealing with intentions has been 
found to be more important (more accessible, more heavily weighted, etc.) 
than the dimension related to abilities: ‘Knowing whether the intentions 
of the other are good or bad (relative to oneself) is more important than 
knowing what the other can do’. In this way, studies have reported that the 
perceived expertise or competence of risk communicators may be valued 
less than their perceived openness, at least on certain issues. Eiser et al. 
(2009) asked subjects to rate their trust in six sources of information about 
the risk of contaminated land in their neighbourhood. The sources in-
cluded independent scientists, local council property developers, residents’ 
groups, friends and family and local media. It was found that despite be-
ing perceived as relatively inexpert, residents’ groups and friends and fam-
ily were highly trusted on account of their perceived openness and shared 
interests.	 In	 this	 case,	 openness	 and	 shared	 interests	were	more	 signifi-
cant predictors of trust than the perceived expertise of individual sources. 
Allum (2007) found that shared values are more important for citizens’ 
judgements of trust in scientists involved in the development of GM food 
than beliefs about competence and expertise. In a study of public trust in 
the government’s control of tobacco in Japan, Nakayachi and Cvetkovich 
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(2010) found that assessment of fairness was a stronger predictor of trust 
than assessment of competency on the issue of increasing tobacco tax. Fur-
ther research will reveal the respective contributions of these dimensions 
to trust in particular contexts.
2.2. Causal and associationist views of trust
Alongside examination of the dimensions of trust, investigators have also 
considered the relationship between trust, belief formation and acceptance 
during risk perception. Two models of this relationship have emerged as 
dominant	in	the	literature	(Midden	and	Huijts	2009).	In	the	first	model	–	
the causal view – trust is taken to have an impact on the cognitive process 
of	belief	 formation	about	 risks	and	benefits	which	 in	 turn	 influences	ac-
ceptance. This model proposes an indirect relationship between trust and 
acceptance in that the relationship is mediated by belief formation. In the 
second model – the associationist view – this causal relationship is believed 
to be spurious as both trust and the cognitive process of belief formation 
are the consequence of a third factor. This factor describes one’s attitude 
to a particular risk and is an affective evaluation. On this alternative view, 
there is a direct relationship between trust and acceptance which is not 
mediated	by	belief	formation.	The	significance	of	these	models	lies	in	the	
respective roles of cognitive and affective factors during risk perception. 
Under	the	causal	view,	trust	drives	belief	formation	which	then	influences	
attitudes towards a potentially risky activity or agent. Cognitive factors are 
both prior to, and a determinant of, affective judgements. However, under 
an associationist view, affective factors are the drivers of risk perception, 
with trust and belief formation emergent on those factors. The causal view 
assumes that rational, cognitive factors are the dominant consideration in 
risk perception, while these factors are largely subordinate to affect in the 
associationist view. The relevance of this positioning of cognition and affect 
will be addressed in the next section.
Both causal and associationist models have received substantial empiri-
cal support. In support of the causal view, López-Navarro et al. (2013) ex-
amined the relationship between trust and risk perception in relation to a 
petrochemical industrial complex located in the port of Castellón in Spain. 
These	investigators	found	a	significant	causal	relationship	between	trust	in	
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petrochemical companies and citizens’ health risk perception, with trust in 
companies negatively affecting risk perception. Terpstra (2011) examined 
the	relationship	between	trust	 in	flood	protection,	flood	risk	perceptions	
and	flood	preparedness	 intentions	 in	Dutch	citizens	 in	 two	coastal	 com-
munities and one river area community. A higher level of trust was found 
to	reduce	citizens’	perceptions	of	flood	likelihood	which,	in	turn,	hampered	
their	flood	preparedness	intentions.	Terwel	et	al.	(2009)	examined	the	re-
lationship	between	trust,	judgements	about	the	risks	and	benefits	of	car-
bon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) technology, and attitudes towards 
this technology. The organizational position (pro or con) on CCS imple-
mentation	was	found	to	more	strongly	affect	risk	and	benefit	perceptions	
and subsequent acceptance of CCS when competence-based trust was high 
rather than low. Terwel et al. (2009, p. 1138) state that ‘the current ex-
perimental research offers support for the causal chain account of trust’. 
A	further	finding	is	that	the	relationship	between	trust	and	perceived	risks	
and	benefits	has	been	found	to	obtain	only	when	subjects	lack	knowledge	of	
an activity or agent. In a study of trust and knowledge in the context of haz-
ardous technologies and activities, Siegrist and Cvetkovich (2000) found 
strong	correlations	between	social	 trust	and	perceived	risks	and	benefits	
only when subjects did not possess much knowledge of the technologies 
concerned. 
The associationist view also has empirical support. Frewer et al. (2003) 
obtained evidence that trust is a consequence of the attitudes one holds 
towards a potentially risky activity or agent. In a study of the attitudes to-
wards GM foods of 1,405 consumers from four European countries, these 
investigators found little effect of information provision on attitudes to 
these foods. It was found that the characteristics of information sources 
and the type of information strategy used had almost no effect on subjects’ 
attitudes	to	GM	foods.	Trust	did	not	influence	how	subjects	responded	to	
the information provided but was itself a consequence of subjects’ attitudes 
to GM foods. In a later study of trust in relation to GM foods, Poortinga and 
Pidgeon	(2005)	also	obtained	support	for	the	associationist	view.	Specific	
risk judgements, these investigators argued, are driven more by general 
evaluative judgements than by trust. Bronfman and López Vázquez (2011) 
examined the relationship between social trust in management authorities 
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and the degree of public acceptability of hazards for individuals residing 
in either developed or emerging Latin America economies. Trust in regu-
latory	bodies	in	Latin	American	economies	was	strongly	and	significantly	
linked to the public’s acceptance of an activity or technology, i.e. there was 
a direct effect of social trust on the extent of public acceptability. Moreover, 
a	lack	of	knowledge	strengthened	the	magnitude	and	statistical	significance	
of the trust-acceptability relationship. Bronfman and López Vázquez (2011, 
p. 1931) state that this result ‘implies that the causal model of trust […] 
would have low explanatory power for the trust-acceptability relationship 
and that acceptance of a particular activity or technology will be mostly 
governed directly by public trust in regulatory activities’.
3. A logical view of trust
In proposing a logical view of trust in risk perception, my aim is not to 
challenge research of the type examined in section 2. Rather, my concern 
is to introduce a novel conceptual perspective, which has much to offer an 
understanding of trust in public health. The view of trust proposed in this 
section sets out from the claim that there is a lack of a logical perspective in 
discussions of trust in risk perception. Regardless of one’s position on the 
relationship between trust and acceptance during risk perception, there is 
an implicit acknowledgement among investigators that a rational process 
of sorts is at work in perception. Moreover, this process is assumed to be 
adequately represented by the inclusion of cognitive factors such as belief 
formation. However, this understanding seriously underplays the rational, 
logical character of risk perception in general and of the role of trust in that 
perception. The type of logical framework envisaged here is overarching 
in scope and subsumes many of the features described in section 2. But 
where it differs from the models described in that section is in its explana-
tory	power.	Specifically,	trust	and	factors	related	directly	or	indirectly	to	it	
are mediated through a logical argument, which can account for a range of 
empirical	findings	whilst	also	elaborating	the	rational	basis	of	risk	percep-
tion. That trust is related to public acceptance of an activity or technology, 
either directly or indirectly, is something very much worth knowing. But 
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this	does	not	tell	us	the	type	of	rational	significance	which	people	attach	
to this relationship, where this may include the purpose for which trust is 
invoked in a particular case and the relative importance of trust alongside 
other rational resources. Only a logical framework which interrogates the 
rational grounds which people attribute to trust in reasoning can adequate-
ly address these considerations. It is to an elaboration of this framework 
that we now turn.
3.1. Argument from authority
A certain sub-discipline of logic is relevant to the view of trust that will 
be developed in this section. That sub-discipline is called informal logic. 
Informal logicians study the many different forms of argument, which can-
not be characterized adequately using formal (deductive) logic, but which 
are nonetheless rationally acceptable. These arguments include presump-
tive or plausible arguments which do not satisfy deductive criteria such as 
validity and soundness, even though they are rationally warranted in the 
particular contexts in which they are used. These arguments also include 
well-known names such as slippery slope argument and analogical argu-
ment, and some like the argument from ignorance and question-begging 
argument which are altogether less prominent. What these latter argu-
ments have in common is that they are so-called informal fallacies. For 
most of the long history of logic, these arguments have been character-
ized as weak or fallacious forms of reasoning by the logicians and philoso-
phers who have commented upon them. It was not until the publication of 
Charles Hamblin’s book Fallacies in 1970 that these arguments began to 
receive the same serious attention that had been afforded to other branches 
of logic. As part of the more systematic treatment of the informal fallacies 
which has emerged in a post-Hamblin era, some logicians began to charac-
terize non-fallacious variants of these fallacies.2 Arguments which had once 
2 Two Canadian logicians, Douglas Walton and John Woods, have been particularly im-
portant in this regard. In a large number of books and articles spanning many years, Woods 
and Walton have undertaken analyses of non-fallacious variants of most of the major infor-
mal fallacies. Amongst others, this includes petitio principii (begging the question), argu-
mentum ad ignorantiam (the argument from ignorance), and argumentum ad baculum 
(the argument from the stick or appeal to force) (Walton, 1985, 1992; Woods, 1995, 2004). 
Also see Cummings (2000) for discussion of the non-fallaciousness of petitio principii.
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been criticized for falling short of deductive ideals such as validity came to 
be described as rationally warranted in certain contexts of use. One such 
argument is the argument from authority or expertise, also known as argu-
mentum ad verecundiam (literally, appeal to modesty). This argument is 
integral to the logical view of trust that is proposed in this paper and will be 
examined further in this section.
The argument from authority is a type of defeasible or plausible reason-
ing of the following form, in which A is a proposition, E is an expert and D is 
a domain of knowledge. In essence, E produces an assertion that a proposi-
tion A is true. The rational standing of this assertion is dependent on E’s 
credentials	as	an	expert	 in	a	particular	field	or	domain	D. To the extent 
that these credentials are genuine, a level of rational warrant attaches to 
E’s assertion. This warrant then becomes the basis for claiming with some 
plausibility that A is true:
 E is an expert in domain D.
 E asserts that A is known to be true.
 A is within D.
 Therefore, A may (plausibly) be taken to be true. (Walton, 1997, p. 258)
As with other informal fallacies, this argument has been dismissed as a 
weak form of reasoning by most logicians who have ventured to describe 
it	 in	 historical	 logical	 treatises.	 The	 logical	 flaw	 of	 this	 argument,	 it	 is	
claimed, resides in features of the individual whose opinion is the basis of 
the argument. This individual can only offer a subjective opinion, which 
is	not	an	objective	basis	upon	which	to	base	a	scientific	inquiry.3 After all, 
subjective	 opinions	may	 reflect	 personal	 interests	 rather	 than	 a	 concern	
for the truth. Authorities can make pronouncements outside of their area 
of expertise and may be opinion trend-setters rather than true authorities. 
3 Whilst not agreeing with this view, Woods and Walton (1974, p. 136) characterize it 
as follows: ‘to allow an appeal to authority as a genuine form of acceptable argument is to 
throw	scientific	objectivity	to	the	winds.	How	often	do	we	hear	it	said	that	an	explanation	or	
prediction	is	“scientific”	(i.e.	reputable)	only	if	it	is	intersubjective,	reproducible,	and	so	not	
dependent upon the private evaluation of a particular individual? According to this way of 
thinking an appeal to authority, having intrinsically inexact and subjective elements about 
it, must be ruled out of the domain of science entirely’.
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An authority appeal may also be so vague that it is not possible to identify 
the individual who produces an expert opinion (Walton, 1989). Accord-
ingly, it is not possible to check the credibility of the authority’s statements. 
Notwithstanding	these	various	flaws	of	the	argument	from	authority,	there	
are also circumstances under which this argument is rationally warranted. 
Authorities	may	be	eminently	qualified	to	offer	an	opinion	on	an	issue.	This	
qualification	 can	be	 evidenced	by	academic	and	other	qualifications	and	
by	a	high	professional	standing	in	a	certain	field.	Authorities	often	make	
pronouncements out of a concern for truth and are not always motivated 
by commercial, political or other interests. Authorities often exercise re-
sponsibility by limiting their comments to topics of which they have ex-
pert knowledge, and clearly indicating when an issue falls outside of their 
expertise. Under these circumstances, it is rationally warranted to appeal 
to the opinions of authorities in argument. These valid uses of authority 
appeals, fallacy theorists have argued, should not be obscured by the many 
weak or fallacious instances of this argument.
So, it is now widely accepted by logicians that an appeal to authority in 
argument does not necessarily commit one to weak or fallacious reason-
ing. However, present-day fallacy theorists have gone further than simply 
acknowledging the existence of non-fallacious uses of this argument. The 
argument is now the focus of increasingly sophisticated presumptive and 
pragmatic analyses. These analyses have resulted in the development of 
non-deductive criteria against which the argument may be rationally eval-
uated,	both	in	general	and	in	specific	contexts	(e.g.	 legal	argumentation)	
(Walton, 1996, 1997; Godden and Walton, 2006; Wagemans, 2011). One 
particularly recent development in the analysis of the argument from au-
thority is its characterization as a reasoning heuristic (Walton 2010). Un-
der this view, certain informal fallacies like the argument from authority 
are not only non-fallacious, but also function as a cognitive shortcut dur-
ing reasoning about complex problems. These are problems about which 
we lack (expert) knowledge but which demand a solution nonetheless. The 
heuristic function of several informal fallacies has been examined in the 
context of public health problems including the BSE epidemic in the UK 
and the emergence of HIV/AIDS in the early 1980s (Cummings, 2012a, 
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2012b, 2013a, 2014b). These fallacies include arguments from ignorance 
and authority, analogical argument, circular argument and argumentum 
ad baculum or the appeal to force (Cummings, 2002, 2004, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012c, 2013b, 2014c, 2014d). What these studies revealed is that 
arguments, which were previously viewed as fallacious, conferred a num-
ber	of	epistemic	gains	on	the	scientific	inquiries	of	which	they	were	a	part.	
These gains ranged from bridging gaps in knowledge about a new disease 
(the argument from ignorance) to using similarity between two pathogens 
to draw conclusions about the features of the lesser known pathogen (ana-
logical argument). In each of these cases, informal fallacies were shown to 
function as quick and effective shortcuts which enabled scientists and oth-
ers to bypass a lack of knowledge and arrive at (mostly) accurate solutions 
to problems. 
A similar heuristic function has been proposed for the argument from 
authority. According to Walton (2010, p. 164), the type of model that best 
captures this function is a defeasible argumentation scheme. This scheme 
is not deductively valid and has both a full and an abridged form. These 
forms correspond to a complete logical argument and the heuristic based 
on that argument, respectively. The full form of the scheme is the focus of 
critical	 questions	which	 ‘flesh	out’	 the	 rational	 grounds	of	 an	 argument.	
These questions are modelled via assumptions and exceptions (both types 
of premises) that are added to the explicit premises in the full scheme of 
an argument (see Figure 1). Assumptions and exceptions may be taken to 
represent responses to questions that aim to lay bare the rational grounds 
of a particular argument. For example, in the case of the argument from 
authority or expert opinion in Figure 1, an assumption to the effect that an 
individual E is	an	expert	in	the	field	to	which	claim	A belongs is central to 
the rational standing of this argument. A parascheme, which models the 
heuristic that corresponds to the full scheme, overlooks these assumptions 
and exceptions. This can be seen in Figure 1 where the heuristic jumps to a 
conclusion (‘A is true’) on the basis of just two ordinary premises without 
taking into account any of the assumptions and exceptions:
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Figure 1. Heuristic of Argument from Expert Opinion, taken from Walton (2010, 
p. 170).
Walton (2010, p. 171) characterizes the particular heuristic represented in 
Figure 1 as taking us by a ‘fast and frugal leap directly to the conclusion’. In 
so doing, it bypasses the implicit conditional premise in the top right cor-
ner of the above diagram, as well as the assumptions and exceptions. The 
consideration of these additional factors requires extra processing time. 
These factors are addressed in a newer (in evolutionary terms) cognitive 
system which is characterized by controlled, conscious and slow inferential 
processing. An ‘older’ cognitive system of reasoning in evolutionary terms, 
which is the home of heuristic procedures, avoids this additional delibera-
tion.	By	doing	so,	this	system	achieves	certain	efficiencies	such	as	an	in-
crease in the speed of processing. 
This view of the argument from authority as a cognitive heuristic marks 
the most recent turn in a remarkable journey for this argument. This jour-
ney has seen the argument move from a place of neglect and condemnation 
during most of the long history of logic, through a stage of positive re-eval-
uation to the current point where it is seen to make a substantial contribu-
tion to our rational resources. The question now is how this same argument 
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can shed new light on our understanding of trust in a public health context. 
It is to that question that we now turn. 
3.2. Trust and the argument from authority
The proposal of this paper is that the argument from authority can serve 
as a logical framework for the notion of trust that is the basis of all public 
health work. In this section, this idea is teased out in an explicit manner, 
beginning with an account of how this argument can accommodate the 
empirical	findings	relating	to	trust	which	were	described	in	section	2.	The	
dimensions of trust that were discussed in section 2.1 effectively ground the 
premises in an argument from authority. To demonstrate this, we need to 
repeat the authority argument presented above:
 E is an expert in domain D.
 E asserts that A is known to be true.
 A is within D.
 Therefore, A may (plausibly) be taken to be true. (Walton, 1997: 258)
The two primary dimensions of trust – competence and integrity – 
ground	 the	 first	 and	 second	 premises	 of	 this	 argument,	 respectively.	 In	
order	for	the	first	premise	‘E is an expert in domain D’ to be rationally war-
ranted, there must be evidence that E has genuine expertise in a particular 
area. E must be able to demonstrate competence in a domain and have 
expert knowledge of its contents. This competence is normally indicated by 
academic	and	other	qualifications	and/or	a	high	professional	standing	in	a	
field.	The	integrity	dimension	of	trust	is	equally	important	to	the	rational	
warrant of the second premise ‘E asserts that A is known to be true’. In or-
der for this premise to be rationally warranted, there must be grounds for 
believing that E’s assertion of a proposition constitutes a credible basis for 
believing it to be true. Unless E is recognised to be honest, objective and 
reliable, the rational warrant which attaches to his or her assertions will be 
minimal indeed. Through grounding two different, but equally important, 
premises in an argument from authority, the competence and integrity di-
mensions	of	trust	assume	a	logical	character	in	reasoning	for	the	first	time.	
This logical view of the dimensions of trust also explains a further em-
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pirical	finding	discussed	in	section	2.1.	That	finding	concerns	the	greater	
importance which people attribute to integrity over competence in their as-
sessments	of	trust.	Specifically,	people	are	so	influenced	by	integrity	in	de-
terminations of trust that even a small perceived reduction in integrity has 
a large, adverse impact on trust. Moreover, this impact is disproportionate 
to any gains in trust that are brought about by the perceived competence 
of a source. Under a logical view of trust, this asymmetry between integrity 
and competence is explained in terms of the plausibility of the premises in 
the above argument from authority. According to the plausible reasoning 
framework proposed by Rescher (1976), the conclusion of a plausible argu-
ment cannot be less plausible than the least plausible proposition among a 
set of premises: ‘…the plausibility-ranking of a plausible thesis that is deriv-
able from some group of mutually consistent theses is never to be less than 
that of the least plausible thesis operative in the derivation’ (12). Because 
people appear to be more doubtful of the integrity than the competence of a 
source, their inclination in argument will be to attribute a lower plausibility 
ranking to any premise that is grounded in integrity factors such as open-
ness and honesty. That premise is represented in the above argument from 
authority by the proposition ‘E asserts that A is known to be true’. The low 
plausibility ranking of this premise tends to exert undue logical sway over 
the argument in that even a premise with a higher plausibility ranking (e.g. 
the premise ‘E is an expert in domain D’) can be undermined by this ‘weak 
link’ in the argument. Under a logical view of trust, the asymmetry between 
integrity and competence in determinations of trust is represented by dif-
ferent plausibility rankings for premises in an argument from authority.
Aside from the dimensions of trust, a logical view of trust can also ex-
plain	the	type	of	empirical	findings	which	have	given	rise	to	the	causal	and	
associationist accounts examined in section 2.2. Essentially, the difference 
between these accounts can be stated in the following terms: either judge-
ments	about	the	perceived	risks	and	benefits	of	an	activity	or	agent	mediate	
the relationship between trust and public acceptability (causal account), or 
trust	influences	acceptability	directly	(associationist	account).	The	differ-
ence between these accounts can be further characterized in terms of cog-
nitive	and	affective	routes	between	trust	and	public	acceptability.	Specifi-
cally,	judgements	about	perceived	risks	and	benefits	in	the	causal	account	
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introduce a rational, cognitive component into the relationship between 
trust and public acceptability. These judgements involve logical thinking 
as subjects must make a rational assessment of the risk of an activity based 
on	evidence.	However,	where	trust	directly	influences	acceptability,	as	in	
the associationist account, an affective route is dominant. Given that there 
is considerable, empirical support for both these accounts, an account that 
combines cognitive and affective routes rather than gives precedence to 
one of these routes, is likely to be a more productive way forward. A logical 
view of trust, I contend, represents just such an account. The logical, ratio-
nal approach of the cognitive route is represented by the critical questions 
to which the assumptions and exceptions of Figure 1 above are answers. 
This slower, deliberative route of processing, which aims to develop the ra-
tional grounds of the argument from authority (and the trust relationship 
which this argument may be taken to represent), stands in stark contrast 
to	the	quick,	heuristic	route	of	processing,	which	is	also	depicted	in	this	fig-
ure. This heuristic, affective route bypasses critical questions and achieves 
gains	in	speed	and	efficiency	through	doing	so.	
A logical view of trust is, thus, capable of representing the cognitive and 
affective factors that play an instrumental role in the relationship between 
trust and public acceptability. Cognitive and affective routes are repre-
sented by the deliberative (critical questioning) and heuristic routes of pro-
cessing displayed in Figure 1, respectively. But this new view of trust can 
also	explain	a	 further	empirical	finding	of	both	causal	and	associationist	
accounts.	This	is	the	finding	that	in	the	absence	of	knowledge,	the	relation-
ship	between	trust	and	perceived	risks	and	benefits	(causal	account)	and	
between trust and acceptability (associationist account) is strengthened. 
A cognitive route of processing demands a knowledgeable agent who can 
pose pertinent critical questions and also assess the logical and rational 
merits of responses to those questions. For example, I can only determine 
if ‘E	 is	 sufficiently	 knowledgeable	 as	 an	 expert	 source’	 (an	 assumption	
in Figure 1), if I have some knowledge of the area in which E is claiming 
expertise	and	of	what	it	would	mean	to	be	‘sufficiently	knowledgeable’	in	
that	area.	But	it	is	not	difficult	to	think	of	a	large	range	of	domains	of	rel-
evance to public health (toxicology, virology, etc.) where that knowledge 
is not available to a reasoning agent. Under these circumstances, reliance 
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on trust guides the agent’s reasoning as a type of default mechanism in the 
absence of knowledge. This default mechanism is none other than the heu-
ristic (affective) processing route depicted in Figure 1. While cognitive and 
affective processing routes can run in parallel, evolutionary pressures on 
our rational resources have ensured that the least costly processing route 
(the heuristic route) assumes precedence wherever this is possible. A lack 
of	knowledge	of	a	field	or	discipline	on	the	part	of	a	reasoning	agent	is	one	
scenario where this is possible. 
We have seen that a logical view of trust can explain the main empiri-
cal	findings	related	to	this	concept	in	a	more	parsimonious	manner	than	
has been possible using other models. However, it was emphasized above 
that the aim of the current discussion is not to replace these models, but 
rather to demonstrate the insights that a logical view can bring to our un-
derstanding of trust in a public health context. Accordingly, it will be useful 
to	highlight	a	number	of	specific	gains	of	a	logical	view	of	trust	by	way	of	a	
conclusion to this section. Firstly, a logical view places trust at the centre 
of the rational processes that are the basis of judgement-making. Rather 
than trust and other affect-based judgements operating apart from logical 
processes of reasoning, the characterization of trust in the form of an argu-
ment from authority allows it to be integral to those logical processes. This 
view not only achieves a closer alignment between rationality and emotion 
– it is rational to derive conclusions during reasoning which are based on 
affective considerations – but it also expands the set of rational resources 
which can be used in public health deliberations. Secondly, in a logical view 
of trust, heuristic reasoning is afforded the logical status that is typically 
reserved for systematic reasoning. Heuristic reasoning simply takes a dif-
ferent (shorter) route to that of systematic reasoning between the premises 
and the conclusion of an argument from authority. This new, logical stand-
ing of heuristic reasoning is consonant with recent approaches to heuristics 
which emphasize the rational, cognitive virtues of these procedures (e.g. 
Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009). Thirdly, if trust is to be explained in terms 
of the rational warrant which attends the premises in an argument from 
authority, then this suggests the possibility of a ‘logical corrective’ to a lack 
of	trust	in	a	public	health	context.	Specifically,	we	need	to	examine	the	ra-
tional grounds of people’s trust-based judgements.
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4. Study of public health reasoning
It was in an effort to explore the rational grounds of people’s trust-based 
judgements in a public health context that a study of public health reason-
ing was conducted. The full details of this study are reported elsewhere 
(Cummings, 2014c). In this section, an overview of the main features and 
findings	of	the	investigation	is	presented	in	preparation	for	consideration	
of its implications for the conduct of public health communication in sec-
tion 5. A questionnaire was completed anonymously by 879 members 
of the public. All subjects were between 18 and 65 years of age and were 
drawn from diverse socioeconomic, educational and ethnic backgrounds 
(see Table 1). Subjects were presented with a number of public health prob-
lems in a series of passages. These problems represented actual and non-
actual (but plausible) public health scenarios upon which various authori-
ties were seen to make an intervention. The eight passages that examined 
arguments from authority are shown in Table 2. Epistemic and logical con-
ditions which are related to the rational warrant of these arguments were 
systematically varied across the eight passages. These conditions are also 
indicated in Table 2. Each passage was followed by four questions which 
fulfilled	 a	 number	 of	 different	 purposes	 in	 the	 study.	 Two	questions	 re-
quired a yes-no response, and were intended to create the impression in 
respondents that they were participating in a reading comprehension task. 
A third question required subjects to indicate if they found an authority 
argument in the passage to be valid, moderately valid or not valid at all. A 
fourth question asked subjects to develop the grounds for their response 
to the authority question. The following passage and questions were used 
to examine the condition <genuine, impartial expertise> in the context of 
an actual public health problem, the emergence of bovine spongiform en-
cephalopathy (BSE) in British cattle in the 1980s:
During the UK’s BSE epidemic, the government looked to independent 
expert	 scientific	 committees	 for	public	health	advice.	 In	 this	way,	 the	
Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) was estab-
lished to assess the risks that BSE posed to human health. Among the is-
sues considered by SEAC was the safety of beef for human consumption. 
SEAC consistently advised that beef could be safely eaten by the Brit-
Public health reasoning: A logical view of trust / l. Cummings
52
COGENCY  Vol. 6, N0. 1, Winter 2014 ISSN 0718-8285
ish consumer. This advice resulted from a process that drew on exper-
tise	from	a	wide	range	of	animal	and	human	health	fields.	These	fields	
included virology, immunology, neuropathology, veterinary science, 
public health science, epidemiology and statistics. The experts who de-
livered	this	advice	were	leading	figures	in	their	fields	of	specialisation.	
Moreover, they were employed by academic departments which enabled 
them to deliver advice that was independent of political and commercial 
interference. For example, Professor Jeff Almond of SEAC was an expert 
in virology and immunology from the School of Animal and Microbial 
Sciences at the University of Reading.
(a)	Name	three	fields	of	expertise	that	were	represented	on	SEAC.
(b) How do you rate the advice given by SEAC?
Circle answer: Valid Moderately valid Not valid at all
(c) Please explain your response to (b).
(d)	Did	SEAC	only	contain	experts	in	human	health	fields?
Quantitative and qualitative analyses of participants’ responses provide 
support for the view that people are attune to the logical and epistemic con-
ditions under which arguments from authority are more or less rationally 
warranted. Moreover, they are adept at articulating the grounds which hold 
sway in their logical judgements. As predicted, most subjects rated genuine, 
impartial expertise as valid in both actual (65.7%) and non-actual (57.1%) 
scenarios. An altogether smaller number of subjects judged dubious, par-
tial expertise to be valid in actual and non-actual scenarios (3.8% and 3.4%, 
respectively). Also as predicted, most subjects rated dubious, partial exper-
tise as not valid at all in both actual (69.6%) and non-actual (59.6%) sce-
narios. Again, a small number of subjects judged genuine, impartial exper-
tise to be not valid at all in actual and non-actual scenarios (6.3% and 9.9%, 
respectively). Between these extremes of expertise, subjects were adept at 
varying their logical judgements in accordance with subtle adjustments in 
the expertise of authorities. This can be seen in the diagram below, where 
ratings of validity decreased the further expertise was seen to move away 
from the ‘ideal state’ (i.e. genuine, impartial expertise). The diagram pres-
ents results for passages representing actual public health scenarios:
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MAXIMUM
 
  (1) Genuine, impartial expertise: 65.7% valid; 6.3% not  
   valid at all
  (2) Dubious, impartial expertise: 21.5% valid; 24% not  
   valid at all
Rational 
Warrant   (3) Genuine, partial expertise: 4.2% valid; 62% not valid  
   at all
  (4) Dubious, partial expertise: 3.8% valid; 69.6% not 
   valid at all 
 MINIMUM
A	number	 of	 significant	Pearson	 chi-square	 values	 indicated	 that	 differ-
ences in subjects’ logical judgements could not be explained by chance. For 
example, the distinction between genuine and dubious expertise in scenar-
ios 1 and 8 (see Table 2) and impartial and partial expertise in scenarios 1 
and	4	both	resulted	in	significant	chi-square	values	of	0.042	and	0.049	(p	
< 0.05), respectively. Findings of this type suggested that these epistemic 
attributes of expertise had some psychological reality for subjects in what-
ever rational capacity they were using to make judgements about the public 
health scenarios contained in the passages. There was also some evidence 
that subjects responded differently to actual and non-actual public health 
events.	A	significant	chi-square	value	of	0.012	(p	<	0.05)	was	obtained	for	
the passage comparison between scenarios 3 and 4. These passages exam-
ined the development of Reye’s syndrome in children as a result of taking 
aspirin (actual scenario) and a possible link between the development of a 
cancer called multiple myeloma and residency in the vicinity of a nuclear 
facility	(non-actual	scenario).	Subjects	were	significantly	less	likely	to	rate	
the pronouncements of scientists as valid or moderately valid in the case of 
Reye’s syndrome than they were in the case of the nuclear power facility. 
Possible	explanations	of	this	finding	is	that	subjects	are	less	likely	to	accept	
scientific	verdicts	as	valid	when	there	is	a	perceived	health	risk	to	children	
or when these verdicts are given by American scientists, both of which are 
features of the passage on Reye’s syndrome. This could indicate that the 
>
<
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largely British subjects in the study were displaying greater trust in British 
than	in	American	scientists.	Whatever	factor	or	factors	were	influential	in	
subjects’	ratings	of	scientific	authorities	in	these	particular	scenarios,	it	is	
further	evidence	that	background	knowledge	and	beliefs	play	a	significant	
role in the reasoning of subjects.
Responses	to	the	open-ended	questions	after	each	passage	confirmed	
these	quantitative	findings,	and	supported	 the	 idea	 that	 specific	 types	of	
expertise held logical sway for the subjects in this study. A range of positive 
attributes featured in the grounds advanced by subjects for rating expertise 
as valid. These attributes included the professional status of experts, which 
was variously expressed in terms of professional standards, integrity and 
conduct. The knowledge and disciplinary backgrounds of experts, their lev-
el of specialization and their perceived independence were also important 
determinants of expertise for subjects:
Professional status:
‘Although the working group was appointed by and had research fund-
ed by BNF [British Nuclear Fuels] the leading academics would have 
reported	the	true	findings	of	their	research.	Their	professional	conduct	
would	have	meant	that	 they	are	not	 influenced	by	BNF’	(41-year-old,	
university educated, British male)
Knowledge:
‘As a general practitioner who had medical knowledge and had experi-
enced the respiratory symptoms, he may have a valid point’ (43-year-
old, university educated, British female)
Independence:
‘The	SEAC	contained	experts	in	a	variety	of	fields.	Also	the	experts	were	
from academic institutes so independent from policy makers’ (25-year-
old, university educated, British male)
Specialization:
‘They	are	still	specialists	within	an	associated	field	so	there	[sic]	conclu-
sions can be counted towards a decision […]’ (29-year-old, secondary 
school educated, Irish male)
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Disciplinary backgrounds:
‘A broad range of scientists from relevant disciplines was selected which 
gives some credibility’ (38-year-old, university educated, British male)
A number of negative attributes were included in the grounds advanced by 
subjects who rated the expertise in particular scenarios to be not valid at 
all. These attributes included a lack of knowledge and restricted scope of 
expertise. Other comments mentioned a lack of objectivity which was often 
related to the funding of research and payment of consultancy fees. Many 
respondents	also	remarked	on	what	they	considered	to	be	flaws	in	scientific	
methodology. These comments often addressed the size of samples used in 
studies and the selection of subjects for inclusion in these samples:
Lack of knowledge:
‘They were not medical experts so, possibly, they did not have a lot of 
knowledge of causes and effects of such cancers’ (31-year-old, second-
ary school educated, British female) 
Restricted scope of expertise:
‘Leading	experts	and	independent	figures,	but	I’d	want	further	details	
on the expertise of those involved – Almond ticks the ‘virology’ and ‘im-
munology’ boxes, but his school suggests his expertise may relate to 
animals, rather than humans’ (32-year-old, university educated, British 
female)
Lack of objectivity:
‘the	findings	of	the	review	panel	are	contaminated	by	the	fact	that	the	
experts received a consultancy fee – the introduction of money does 
not make for an objective enquiry’ (48-year-old, university educated, 
British male)
Flawed	scientific	methodology:
‘The	sample	of	12	children	who	he	(Dr	Wakefield)	conducted	tests	on	
was	an	insufficient	number	to	base	this	link	on’	(37-year-old,	university	
educated, British male)
Public health reasoning: A logical view of trust / l. Cummings
56
COGENCY  Vol. 6, N0. 1, Winter 2014 ISSN 0718-8285
‘Some children were involved in both the studies carried out by Dr 
Wakefield	 and	 this	 could	 represent	 a	 potential	 conflict	 of	 interest’	
(32-year-old, university educated, British female)
Subjects could also be seen to weigh up competing considerations. This 
was particularly evident in passages which examined ‘mixed expertise’, 
that is, where a positive attribute on one continuum (e.g. genuine-dubious 
expertise) was matched with a negative attribute on another continuum 
(e.g. impartial-partial expertise). It was particularly commonplace for sub-
jects to weigh factors such as expertise and professional integrity against a 
financial	conflict	of	interest.	On	some	occasions,	the	positive	attribute	was	
seen to ‘win out’ while on other occasions, the negative attribute appeared 
to	exert	greater	influence:
Expertise	versus	conflict	of	interest:
‘The panel consisted of leading experts in pharmacoepidemiology 
– which gives it some validity – but the fact that the review panel re-
ceived a consultancy fee from pharmaceutical companies would make 
me	question	the	review	panel’s	final	decision’	(37-year-old,	university	
educated, British female)
‘I	 can’t	 believe	 a	panel	 of	 leading	 scientific	 experts	would	 completely	
prostitute	their	views	for	money,	and	their	findings	would	need	to	stand	
up to scrutiny. However, their interpretation of the material is bound 
to favour the pharmaceutical companies’ (50-year-old, university edu-
cated, British female)
Conflict	of	interest	versus	professional	integrity:
‘Even though the consultants had all previously worked for mobile 
phone companies I must assume they individually retain professional 
integrity – so their response is relatively valid’ (58-year-old, university 
educated, British male)
When	confronted	with	‘mixed	expertise’,	subjects	almost	always	reflected	
the pull of competing factors by rating these scenarios as moderately valid.
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5. Concluding remarks
This paper has proposed a new, logical perspective for the understanding 
of trust in a public health context. This perspective draws on the conceptual 
resources of informal logic and, in particular, on an informal fallacy known 
as the argument from authority. This argument was shown to be anything 
but fallacious in certain contexts of use. One such context is public health 
reasoning where a lack of knowledge and certainty precludes the use of 
deductive reasoning and instead necessitates a form of reasoning based 
on presumptions. A presumptively characterized argument from authority 
was	shown	to	explain	the	main	empirical	findings	relating	to	trust	in	a	more	
parsimonious manner than was possible using other models and frame-
works. This included so-called dimensions of trust such as competence and 
integrity as well as the use of trust as a heuristic in reasoning. A logical view 
of trust emphasizes the role of critical questions in developing the rational 
grounds of the premises in the argument from authority. These grounds 
are well developed during systematic reasoning in which there is careful 
deliberation of a number of factors relating to the rational warrant of the 
argument from authority. These same grounds are effectively bypassed in 
heuristic reasoning. To investigate if subjects are adept at recognizing the 
logical and other factors which are integral to the rational warrant of the 
argument from authority, a study of reasoning in 879 members of the pub-
lic was undertaken. Across a number of public health scenarios, logical and 
epistemic conditions associated with the rational warrant of this argument 
were systematically varied. As predicted, subjects were shown to be capable 
of developing the rational basis of the argument from authority, even if 
they are not always called upon to do so in their daily deliberations about 
public health problems.
There are clear implications of a logical view of trust for public health 
practice. This is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in relation to 
public health communication. There has been a tendency in such commu-
nication	to	conflate	a	 lack	of	knowledge	on	the	part	of	 the	 lay	person	on	
matters relating to public health with a lack of a rational capacity to form 
judgements	about	issues	in	public	health.	The	former	deficit	is	an	epistemic	
problem in that a lay person cannot lay claim to the expert knowledge of 
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the scientist, medical professional or public health specialist. But all too of-
ten	this	epistemic	problem	is	confused	with	a	deficit	in	the	logical,	rational	
resources which people use to form judgements about public health prob-
lems. Even in the absence of knowledge – or particularly in the absence 
of knowledge – lay members of the public can draw upon a rich array of 
rational resources to guide their public health judgements. The argument 
from authority is one part of this rational tool-kit. We have seen how this 
argument can mediate the trust relationship between public health experts 
and the populations served by these experts. We have also seen how lay 
members of the public are adept at recognising the conditions under which 
this argument is more or less rationally warranted. To this extent, it is con-
tended that public health professionals should exploit this rational capac-
ity in their communications with the public. Where communications have 
typically reported public health advice, it is proposed that they should also 
attempt to reveal something of the rational process which issued in this 
advice. This could include the authority credentials of those who generated 
the advice in the reasonable expectation that lay members of the public 
can discern these credentials and attribute due rational warrant to them. 
Such an approach to public health communication not only acknowledges 
the rational capacities of the public, but also allows those capacities to be 
exercised in important public health judgements.
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Appendix
Table 1. Subject characteristics.
 SUBJECT CHARACTERISTICS
 (total = 879 subjects)
 AGE  Average: 43.8 years
 Range: 18-65 years
 GENDER  Male: 292 subjects
 Female: 587 subjects
EDUCATION
 
 University level: 589 subjects
 Secondary school level: 290 subjects
ETHNICITY  White British: 789 subjects
 White Irish: 30 subjects
 Asian or British Asian Indian: 15 subjects
 Asian or British Asian Pakistani: 4 subjects
 Black or Black British Caribbean: 3 subjects
 Black or Black British African: 3 subjects
 Mixed: White and Black Caribbean: 1 subject
 Mixed: White and Black African: 1 subject
 Mixed: White and Asian: 1 subject
 Other: 32 subjects 
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Table 2. Public health scenarios.
 Description of public health scenario
 1
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7
 
8 
Genuine, impartial expertise; actual scenario:
Pronouncements on BSE by the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory 
Committee
Genuine, impartial expertise; non-actual scenario:
Use of chemicals in food production
Genuine, partial expertise; actual scenario:
Aspirin use and Reye’s syndrome in children
Genuine, partial expertise; non-actual scenario:
Cancer risks posed by a nuclear power facility
Dubious, partial expertise; actual scenario:
Safety of the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine
Dubious, partial expertise; non-actual scenario:
Electromagnetic emissions from mobile phone masts
Dubious, impartial expertise; actual scenario:
Pronouncements on BSE by the Southwood Working Party
Dubious, impartial expertise; non-actual scenario:
Air-borne chemical emissions from a recycling facility
